2026 Conference Program

                                                The Creighton Club

New York State Philosophical Association

The 171st Conference Program

Saturday October 3rd, 2026

Life Sciences Complex/Building, Room 105

Syracuse University (Syracuse, NY)

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

8:45 AM	Coffee & snacks
9:15 AM	Sanggu Lee (Syracuse University): “In Defense of Neutralism about Quantification” (winner of the Graduate Student Presentation Award) Commentator: Harold Hodes (Cornell University)
10:30 AM	Coffee break
10:45 AM	Aatif Abbas (Colgate University): “Contractualism and Respect” Commentator: Anthony (Tony) Reeves (Binghamton University)
Noon	Lunch break (catered on site)
1:05pm	Business meeting for the Club
1:15 PM	David Dudrick (Colgate University) “Why Tolerate Religion? A Nietzschean Answer to Leiter’s Question” Commentator: Robert (Bob) Guay (Binghamton University)
2:30 PM	Coffee break
2:40 PM	Jens Kipper and Zeynep Soysal (University of Rochester): “Mediated Deliberation Should Aggregate” Commentator: Phyllis Pearson (Hamilton College)

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

The Curious Case of the Complex Numbers

Jill North (Rutgers University)

4 PM

The abstract for this talk can be found below.

MEETING DETAILS: The 2026 meeting will be held on the campus of Syracuse University, in Life Sciences room 105, “Breed Lecture Hall” (within the Life Sciences Complex).

Parking: Much campus parking is open to guests on weekends. The most conveniently located lots are the College Place Lot (called “Quad Lot 4” on google maps), Lyman Hinds Lot (behind Smith Hall) and the Quad Lot.  See the campus parking map linked here.

Lodging: Nearby hotels include the Collegian, Parkview, and Hotel Skyler.

RSVP for Dinner: there will be an informal dinner held after the conference (location TBD).  Please email us at thecreightonclub@gmail.com (cc jhunt11@syr.edu) if you plan to attend, so that we can make a more accurate reservation.

For more details, see: http://creightonclub.blogspot.com

Abstract for Professor North’s talk:

We use mathematical objects and structures to formulate our best physical theories and to represent physical reality.  This gives rise to a host of philosophical questions surrounding the use of mathematics in physics, brought to the fore by a particular case.  

Physicists frequently remark that whereas in classical physics complex numbers are used as merely a dispensable calculational tool, in quantum mechanics complex numbers are truly necessary or essential.  Less often do physicists explain why this is, and among those who do, there is no clear or agreed-upon answer, despite the long history of physicists pondering it.  This remains an outstanding puzzle.  

In this talk, I discuss several interrelated issues brought out by this curious situation.  I argue that complex numbers are not truly necessary for quantum mechanics, against conventional wisdom, although they do yield a perspicuous formulation, for reasons I will mention.  Yet the main focus of the talk concerns neither complex numbers nor quantum mechanics per se.  Rather, I use this case as a springboard for elucidating aspects of the nature and use of mathematical structures in physics in general.  Getting clear on these things is crucial to the foundational project of figuring out what our best physical theories are saying about the nature of physical reality.  It further unearths a phenomenon of significance to the philosophy of mathematics, which tells against a thoroughgoing structuralism about mathematics, even of the relatively minimal methodological kind. 

We thank the Central New York Humanities Corridor as a primary sponsor for this event, along with the Syracuse University Department of Philosophy.